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The concept of the pivot, whereby a new venture 
alters its offering or business model, is standard 
practice among new ventures seeking to validate their 
value proposition in uncertain markets.  Whereas a new 
venture begins with a business model driven by the 
entrepreneur’s perception of the market, pivots driven 
by market feedback align the venture with market need. 
However, we argue that executing too many pivots can 
adversely affect firm performance by postponing the 
maturation of the firm. Using change in a venture’s 
NAICS code as a proxy for pivoting, we show an 
inverted-U relationship between revenue and the 
number of pivots among Kauffman Firm Survey 
participants.  This longitudinal empirical study is one of 
the first on the relationship between pivoting and 
performance.  It aims to attract attention to this 
important topic of entrepreneurship, and help the 
entrepreneur facing the difficult decision of whether or 





Entrepreneurs managing high degrees of uncertainty 
are often faced with the choice of staying committed to 
their original business model or pursuing a new 
direction.  There are two ways entrepreneurs can change 
direction.  They can learn and change incrementally by 
varying a single element of their business model.  
Alternatively, they can make a radical change to their 
strategy by changing multiple elements of their business 
model [1]. The decision to continue with the current 
strategy or pivot away from it is one of the hardest 
decisions that entrepreneurs will face [2].  
The term “pivot” has become part of the everyday 
language of entrepreneurs and those who advise and 
fund them.  It was first coined in 2009 [3] and is defined 
as “a structured course correction designed to test a new 
fundamental hypothesis” [2] (pg 149).  Although the 
term is relatively new, it is closely related to the concept 
of business model innovation in that it defines a broad 
range of change related behaviors.    
Pivoting is promoted and celebrated in the 
entrepreneurship literature with anecdotes often told of 
successful pivots.  For example, Groupon began as a do-
good site called The Point, PayPal started as 
cryptography libraries for Palm Pilot devices, YouTube 
started as a video-dating site, and Twitter began as a 
platform to subscribe to podcasts [4].   
There are many reasons an entrepreneur would 
decide to pivot. Clearly, staying with a business idea that 
is not working could have severe consequences, 
particularly for a start-up which is often focused on a 
single project.  Project failure in this case can put the 
entrepreneur out of business.  Questioning initial low-
potential business models and refining them helps 
entrepreneurs discover and assess multiple alternatives, 
gather valuable information, and make better decisions 
[5]. Failure followed by pivoting is often treated 
positively as a validated learning process [2, 3].  
Research has also found that business model viability is 
greatly improved by business model experimentation. 
For example, pivoting is the most frequently occurring 
commonality among different successful startups [2] 
and committing too early to a specific business model 
can have negative effects on long-term survival and 
performance [1].   
However, pivoting is not a guarantee for success 
especially when changing direction can consume 
resources and move entrepreneurs away from 
competencies.  For example, as entrepreneurs build their 
businesses they become increasingly knowledgeable in 
the associated processes, technologies and markets. 
They may lose that expertise during a pivot resulting in 
lost time and resources [6].  
The importance of pivoting to entrepreneurs 
deserves research attention and currently there is a gap 
in our understanding.  Prior work tends to be conceptual 
[7-9], qualitative [1, 10], or quantitative in the context 
of established firms [11, 12].  Nascent research on 
startup pivots focus on antecedents, i.e. what triggers a 
pivot, such as feedback, entrepreneur characteristics, 
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environmental factors, or investment [6, 13, 14].  In 
general, existing research and knowledge on pivots is 
limited and there has been a call for better understanding 
of business model development in new venutres [5, 13].    
This study fills the research gap in a number of ways. 
First, we use the Kauffman Firm Survey longitudinal 
dataset to empirically investigate the relationship 
between startup success and its pivot activity.  Second, 
recent studies of pivot activities [13, 14] noted that often 
a firm engages in multiple pivots.  Given the fact that 
pivots can redirect a failing business model but at the 
same time consume scarce resources, we investigate if 
there is a threshold to the number of pivots a firm can 
make after which pivots become detrimental to 
performance.  Finally, while research on startup pivots 
is generally done in the context of high-technology we 
study the moderating effect of high-tech versus low-tech 
startups.  Frequent testing, tweaking and pivoting may 
be viable for websites, apps, or other digital products 
that can be addressed by coding changes but not 
traditional manufactured goods.   
Entrepreneurs need to be persistent when facing 
adversity and skepticism.  However they must also be 
flexible enough to leave behind some of the ideas in 
which they invested, and explore different opportunities 
[6]. To the best of the authors knowledge, this study is 
the first of its kind to address the issue of successive 
pivoting, product type, and startup survival.    
 
2. Framework and Hypotheses 
 
Pivot is a recent term and literature definitions 
include phrases such as “change course”, “shift in 
strategy”, or “adapting the business model”.  In other 
words, pivot is often considered synonymous with 
change. More specifically, it is considered as validating 
a hypothesis related to a business model [2, 15] and is 
often considered the path entrepreneurs must take when 
looking for the correct strategy. 
Ries [2] offers ten different types of pivots that 
startups can make such as pivots based on product, 
customer segment and need, platform, business 
architecture, value, engine of growth, channel, and 
technology.  In a study of the software industry, the most 
common external trigger of a pivot was negative 
customer reaction, and the most common internal 
trigger of a pivot was a flawed business model [13].   
Some pivots can be incremental where a small 
element of the product, service, or business model is 
changed.  Other pivots can be radical where significant 
and possibly multiple elements of the business model 
are changed [1]. While it is often argued that successful 
startups must make multiple pivots [16] and pivots are 
often used in a continuous process of validating 
hypotheses, the focus of this study is not incremental 
change.  Instead, our focus is on radical pivots that are 
so significant they cause a change in the startup’s North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
code.  For example, Android began as an operating 
system for cameras and pivoted to the smartphone 
industry.  Flickr was a role playing game that pivoted to 
a photo sharing service [13].  Like continuous 
incremental change, radical pivots can lead to long term 
growth, but unlike continuous incremental change, 
radical pivots are disruptive to the startup and are not as 
well understood [1].     
Startups are under conflicting pressure to cut losses 
and execute changes rapidly, or stay the course and give 
its business model time to succeed and attain legitimacy. 
Cutting losses and making changes, i.e. choosing to 
pivot, is often intuitive.  Staying with a business model 
when there are negative responses from customers, 
unanticipated competitive pressures, or technical 
challenges can lead to business failure.  Using new 
information reduces uncertainty and helps firms find 
better business opportunities.  Startups often need to 
make multiple pivots.  For example, MishGuru began as 
a company that let users design and print their own 
horseshoes.  This idea was not scalable because horse 
owners were not conducive to rapid growth.  They 
pivoted to a collaborative video making site and finally 
ended up as a successful content management system 
for SnapChat. RetentionScience initially provided 
independent artists a platform where they could promote 
niche brands and products via social media. This 
business model proved not to be scalable so it pivoted to 
providing a social media-based analytics and referral 
platform for e-commerce businesses. However, because 
they encountered many well-funded competitors 
working in the same area, they pivoted again towards a 
retention automation platform that makes AI accessible 
to business clients. 
Despite the reasons for pivoting, there are also many 
reasons a startup may decide to persevere and stay the 
course.  Focused commitment to the original business 
plan can positively impact initial growth [1] because 
entrepreneurs learn quickly about technical and market 
issues while staying ahead of competitors.  As 
entrepreneurs build their businesses, they become 
experts on associated processes, technologies, and 
markets.  In such cases, expertise that has taken time and 
resources to develop can be lost with a radical pivot.  In 
other cases, the business model is valid but requires 
longer time to achieve milestones like the first paying 
customer, revenue, or profit.  Furthermore, having one 
clear value proposition for stakeholders allows a firm to 
better attract strategic partners and valuable employees 
[1]. Pivots can harm an entrepreneur’s and creative 
employees’ ownership of their original idea thereby 
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undermining any attempts at change [17]. It would also 
mean changing the mindset of all stakeholders, 
specialized employees, organizational structures, and 
dealing with missing competencies.   
Staying the course also avoids some of the hazards 
of successive pivoting.  One study found that firms can 
have considerable difficulties in mobilizing 
stakeholders and additional resources for subsequent 
pivots leading to bankruptcy in several cases [1]. 
Investors are not always supportive of continued change 
and refrain from injecting large amounts of capital until 
progress has been made.  Successive radical pivots can 
also weaken investor commitment because they begin to 
question whether the business model was wrong or the 
problem lies with the entrepreneurs [18].  
Staged models of new venture evolution [19], 
including the “Valley of Death” model [20, 21], predict 
that firms initially endure a period of time with no 
revenue while they validate their value proposition, 
pivoting when necessary.  This pre-revenue period is 
followed by a post-revenue period with some initial 
sales that validate the value proposition, but are 
insufficient to cover expenses.  During this post-revenue 
pre-break-even period, ventures change their focus from 
innovation to operational efficiency in order to achieve 
profitability (the third period).  The pivoting activity of 
startups occurs primarily in the first phase, where 
success is measured by revenue, not profit.  
Consequently, we use revenue as a measure of pivot 
success.   
Given the conflicting pressure to pivot and 
persevere, we hypothesize that the value of pivoting will 
initially grow with each change but eventually diminish 
as redefining the business model becomes more costly 
or as resources run dry, leading to an inverted-U 
relationship between firm performance and the number 
of pivots: 
 
H1: The revenue of a new venture exhibits an 
inverted-U relationship with the number of pivots. 
 
An entrepreneur’s need to pivot most commonly 
originates from mistaken assumptions of the target 
market and, by extension, the new venture’s value 
proposition.  The uncertainty of markets and value 
propositions is characteristically higher in the high tech 
startup domain than in general.  Consequently, the need 
for pivots to disambiguate this uncertainty is even more 
critical in the high tech startup domain.  While pivoting 
in software based industries is most often researched 
and celebrated, it is also possible in more traditional 
industries.  However, while testing and tweaking of 
websites and apps is often done by simply modifying 
code, pivoting in other sectors is generally considered to 
be much more difficult, see [22, 23].  For these reasons, 
we hypothesize: 
 
H2: The relationship between revenue and pivots is 
different between high-tech firms and low-tech firms. 
 
3. Methods and Data 
 
In this study, we consider a pivot to be a significant 
change in a firm’s business model, as opposed to an 
incremental change such as altering a feature in a firm’s 
product or service.  Because a change to a firm’s North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 
would indicate such a significant change, we use a 
change in the NAICS code to reflect a pivot.  Moreover, 
we represent revenue as a binary variable and not as a 
continuous variable for two reasons.  First, the success 
of pivoting is not so much the amount of revenue but the 
existence of any which in turn reflects business model 
validation.  Second, revenue varies by orders of 
magnitude between industries, and we seek to control 
for this variance. 
This study uses the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) of 
4928 companies founded in 2004 and surveyed annually 
from 2004 to 2011 [24].  The KFS collects information 
about each participating firm’s business characteristics, 
strategy and innovation, business organization and 
human resource benefits, business finances, work 
behavior, and ownership and demographics of its active 
owner and operators.  Specifically, the study uses the 
confidential longitudinal long-format KFS dataset 
(KFS8_L_L1) hosted by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) Data Enclave for the Kauffman 
Foundation [25].  Unlike the public version of the KFS 
which provides only the leftmost two digits of each 
firm’s NAICS code (i.e., the firm’s sector code), the 
confidential dataset provides all six digits, enabling the 
study to detect more subtle pivots that impact the less 
significant digits. 
Because the KFS collects data once a year, we can 
detect one change annually in a firm’s NAICS code, and 
the response to the question: “In calendar year [20XX], 
did [BUSINESS NAME] receive any revenue from the 
sales of goods, services, or intellectual property?” for 
each year between 2004 and 2011 inclusive.  Thus, for 
each year we have the revenue status of the surviving 
responding startups, and can compute the total number 
of pivots (NAICS code changes) that preceded that 
revenue status.  The KFS also reports if each participant, 
at each year, considered itself to be a high-tech firm or 
not.   
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the KFS 
data employed in the study viewed per year.  It shows 
the typical exponential decrease in surviving firms, and 
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that firms in general pivot (radically) early in their 
lifecycle.  There are no pivots detected in 2004 because 
that is the first year of the KFS. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the KFS 
data employed in the study viewed per number of pivots.  
It indicates a non-linear relationship between the odds 
of revenue at any particular year, and the number of 
pivots the startup executed up to and including that year.  
An inverted-U relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 by 
the quadratic trendline of revenue versus number of 
pivots, which is more pronounced among high-tech 
firms.   
 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics of survivorship and pivot activity. 
 High Tech Low Tech 







2004 417 0.00% 0.00 2723 0.00% 0.00 
2005 377 23.87% 0.24 2407 24.18% 0.24 
2006 310 20.97% 0.40 2158 24.42% 0.49 
2007 272 4.78% 0.43 1932 8.44% 0.57 
2008 264 10.98% 0.59 1767 8.77% 0.64 
2009 249 0.80% 0.59 1627 4.06% 0.69 
2010 235 2.98% 0.66 1499 3.40% 0.71 
2011 216 1.85% 0.64 1401 3.28% 0.75 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics of pivot and revenue performance. 
 High Tech Startup Years Low Tech Startup Years 
# of Pivots Total No Revenue Revenue % Revenue Total No Revenue Revenue % Revenue 
0 1782 318 1464 82.2 11088 2376 8712 78.6 
1 234 49 185 79.1 2015 393 1622 80.5 
2 283 44 239 84.4 2059 333 1726 83.8 
3 23 4 19 82.6 178 21 157 88.2 
4 13 7 6 46.1 57 9 48 84.2 
5 2 2  0 32 8 24 75 




Figure 1.  Trend lines of revenue vs. pivots. 
 
To test the hypotheses, we model revenue as a binary 
outcome and perform a quadratic logistic regression, 
using the number of pivots and the number of pivots 
squared as covariates.  The odds ratio of a firm j 
achieving revenue in year t is thus modeled as 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒logit = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡2 � 
 
where βi is the i’th order coefficient of the logit, and pj,t 
is the number of changes to NAICS code (i.e. pivots) the 





Table 3 presents the results of the quadratic logistic 
regression of achieving revenue over number of pivots. 
In all cases (high tech, low tech, and combined), the 
coefficient of the second order term is negative, 
indicating an inverted-U relationship.  The magnitude of 
the second order coefficient is greater among high tech 
firms, indicating that revenue is more sensitive to 
pivoting (the steepness of the curve in Figure 2 is 
greater) among high tech firms than among low tech 
firms. The two hypotheses are thus supported. 
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Among high tech firms, the odds ratio of achieving 
revenue is highest after just one radical pivot, whereas 
among the general cohort the odds ratio is highest after 
three radical pivots.  Among low tech firms, the odds 
ratio is highest after four radical pivots, but the second 
order effect among low tech firms is not statistically 
significant because the logit curve is relatively flat and 
insensitive to the number of pivots. 
 
5. Discussion, Limitations, and Future 
Research 
 
This study empirically confirms the inverted-U 
relationship between performance (probability of 
achieving revenue) and radical pivots (change in NAICS 
code) among startups. Being longitudinal the study was 
able to track the pivoting history of each participating 
firm and compute the running sum of pivots.  The higher 
sensitivity to pivots (greater logit coefficient magnitude) 
among high tech firms may be due to factors previously 
discussed.  Because high tech firms operate in greater 
market uncertainty than low tech firms, they have more 
to benefit from an initial course correction, which would 
explain the steep improvement in performance between 
zero and one pivot.  At the same time, too many pivots 
penalize high tech firms more severely than low tech 
firms, possibly because the former are more dependent 
on being perceived by stakeholders as consistent in such 
uncertainty. 
High tech and low tech firms were found to differ 
not only in the sensitivity to pivoting, but also in the 
optimum number of radical pivots. The weaker penalty 
for “over-pivoting” among low-tech firms may explain 
their higher optimum number of pivots. 
There are several limitations to this study.  The first 
is that the KFS does not reveal multiple pivots that may 
have occurred between annual follow-ups, but only if at 
least one occurred.  A second limitation is the proxy 
used for radical pivot: a change in the self-reported six-
digit NAICS code.  One could argue that a firm could 
undergo a critical pivot without incurring a change to its 
NAICS, although an NAICS change would remain 
being a strong indicator of radical pivot. 
This exploratory research can be continued along 
several directions.  The model can be expanded to 
control for factors that may contribute to sensitivity to 
pivoting, such as a firm’s reliance on investors.  Very 
radical pivots (e.g., a sector change involving the two 
most significant digits of the NACIS code) can be 
distinguished from less radical pivots.  Moreover, it is 
possible that different types of pivots occur with 
different outcomes at different stages of a startup.  Blank 
[15] calls these stages the concept, development, 
working prototype, and mature product stages.  It is 
possible that hesitation to pivot may increase the longer 
a firm has been in existence as the firm is more invested 
in its expertise.  It also may be more risk averse, or 
display more persistence, extreme devotion, or 
overconfidence.   
 
 
Table 3.  Logistic regression results. 
 
Figure 2.  Revenue Odds Ratio versus 
Pivots. 
 High Tech All Firms Low Tech 
 Coeff Stat Sig Coeff Stat Sig Coeff Stat Sig 
β1 0.332 p<0.05 0.219 p<0.01 0.209 p<.001 
β2 -0.164 p<0.01 -0.041 p<0.05 -0.024 N/S 
       





0 1.508 4.517 1.323 3.754 1.295 3.650 
1 1.677 5.348 1.502 4.489 1.480 4.394 
2 1.518 4.565 1.599 4.950 1.618 5.044 
3 1.033 2.809 1.616 5.033 1.708 5.521 
4 0.220 1.246 1.552 4.720 1.751 5.761 
5 -0.920 0.399 1.407 4.082 1.746 5.732 
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